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the former -provision5 5 authorized the court to substitute a new
party plaintiff, if the original plaintiff was not entitled to maintain
the action.
This same question has created marked disagreement in the
federal courts under Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure. It has been held that rule 21 does not admit of substitu-
tion and therefore a sole party plaintiff or defendant could not be
dropped and another added.56 On the other hand, in conformity
with a more liberal approach, substitution has been permitted in
cases where the same person would be a party both before and
after substitution,57 or where there was a mistake as to the person
entitled to bring suit.6s
The court in the present case, by permitting the executor to
become a party plaintiff, seems to indicate that under section 1003
the more liberal view of permitting substitution will be followed.
Here the executor made no formal motion to be made a party
plaintiff, but requested this relief in his affidavit submitted in oppo-
sition to the defendant's motion to dismiss. Certainly the result
is sanctioned by the broad discretion afforded the court under
section 1003 and the precedents under the CPA, indicating that
the section should be liberally construed.5 9 Allowing substitution
will prevent the abatement of an action where the statute of limita-
tions has run, and will expedite trials by avoiding the unnecessary
delay involved in requiring an action to be commenced anew on an
identical subject matter.
Section 1007 and Ride 1010- Third-Party Practice
Section 1007 of the CPLR authorizes impleader where a third
person may be liable over to the defendant "for all or part of the
plaintiff's claim against the defendant," the same criterion used for
third-party practice by the CPA. The purposes of this section are
to avoid a multiplicity of suits and to determine initial and ultimate
liability in one action.60 The CPLR section governing the avail-
55 CPA §§ 192-93.
5 6 Gruman v. Sturgeon Bay Winter Sports Club, 304 F.2d 93 (7th Cir.
1962); Matsuoka v. United States, 28 F.R.D. 350 (D.C. Hawaii 1961);
United States v. Swink, 41 F. Supp. 98 (E.D. Va. 1941). For a criticism
of this view, see 3 Mooas, FEDERAL PRACTIcE § 2907 (2d ed. 1943).57 Owen v. Paramount Productions, 41 F. Supp. 557 (S.D. Cal. 1941).5 8 Hackner v. Guaranty Trust Co., 117 F.2d 95 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
313 U.S. 559 (1941); In re Raabe Glissman & Co., 71 F. Supp. 678
(S.D.N.Y. 1947); Keystone Tel. Co. v. United States, 49 F. Supp. 503
(E.D.N.Y. 1943).
59Albano v. Michaelson, 14 Misc. 2d 76, 175 N.Y.S.2d 949 (Sup. Ct
1958); Mapley v. Board of Educ., 13 Misc. 2d 88, 175 N.Y.S.2d 354 (Sup.
Ct. 1958).
60 See 2 WEINSTEIN, KoRxu & MIuE, Nzv YoRE CivIL PRAcncE i"
1007.01 (1964).
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ability of impleader is by its terms more liberal than its predecessor
in two respects: (1) there is no requirement of an identity be-
tween the original and the third-party claim, and (2) the court,
in its discretion, as authorized by rule 1010,61 may permit entirely
new questions of law and fact to be raised in the third-party
action.
62
In a recent case 63 construing section 1007, plaintiff, alleging
that defendant had stopped payment on his check and that this
constituted a failure of consideration, sought to set aside a deed
given by her to the defendant. Defendant sought to implead as
third-party defendants the plaintiff, her husband and their attorney.
The basis for the indemnity claim was the alleged fraud perpe-
trated by the parties in inducing defendant to contract for purchase
of land with a realty company knowing that title was not in the
company but in the plaintiff and her husband individually. The
court held that no third-party claim was shown, but denied the
motion to dismiss the third-party complaint; it then held, apparent-
ly on its own motion, that even though third-party practice was
unavailable here, the third-party complaint could be treated as an
independent action. It then noted that there were common ques-
tions of law and fact between that action and the main one and,
that being the criteria for consolidation under the CPLR, the court
ordered such consolidation.64
The decision illustrates how readily the procedural devices
of the CPLR can be adjusted to make them subserve, rather than
frustrate, the substantive rights involved. The court indicated that
the theory of third-party practice under the CPLR is substantially
the same as it was under the CPA.' 5 In fact, in determining that
impleader was improper, the court employed the CPA test of
whether the liability of the third-party defendant arose from the
same liabilitv as that of the original defendant. "6 Here the wrong
alleged against the defendant in the main action, viz., stopping
61 Rule 1010 provides: "The court may dismiss a third-party complaint
without prejudice, order a separate trial of the third-party claim or of any
separate issue thereof, or make such other order as may be just. In exer-
cising its discretion, the court shall consider whether the controversy
between the third-party plaintiff and the third-party defendant will unduly
delay the determination of the main action or prejudice the substantial
rights of any party."
62 Ellenberg v. Sydharv Realty Corp., 247 N.Y.S.2d 226 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
63 Ibid.
64 Id. at 230.
65 Id. at 228-29.
66 For cases employing similar tests under the CPA, see Unger v. Horo-
witz, 17 App. Div. 2d 807, 232 N.Y.S.2d 771 (1st Dep't 1962); B.M.C. Mfg.
Corp. v. Tarshis, 278 App. Div. 266, 104 N.Y.S.2d 254 (3d Dep't 1951).
For a discussion of the kind of third-party complaints allowed in the
federal courts, see Note, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 532 (1958).
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payment of the check, did not arise from any act of, and therefore
need not be indemnified by, the third-party defendants.
However, unlike the practice under the CPA, where the com-
plaint would likely have been dismissed,67 Rule 1010 of the CPLR
affords the court broad discretion in disposing of third-party causes
of action. In applying this rule the court examined the relative
equities of the parties and decided that a consolidation would effect
the best result. Though Section 602 of the CPLR, which treats
specifically of consolidation, appears to require a motion for such
relief, the "such other order as may be just" words of rule 1010
appear to give a firm ground to the court's action in the instant
case.
In view of the hesitancy of the courts to dismiss third-party
complaints at the pleading stage,6s and considering the broad dis-
cretion afforded by rule 1010, outright dismissal of third-party
complaints should be less frequent in the future.
Policy Held to Limit Insurer's Right to 1Inplead Tortfeasor
Substantive law determines whether a third-party cause of
action exists.6 9 For example, in the recent case of Ross v. Paw-
tucket Mut. Ins. Co.,70 an insured brought an action against an
insurance carrier on an automobile collision policy. The insurer
served a third-party complaint on the alleged tortfeasors. The
Court of Appeals in affirming the dismissal of the third-party
complaint, held that since the right of subrogation did not accrue
under the policy until payment of the claim by the carrier, the
carrier may not implead the third-party tortfeasors.'-1
Prior to this decision there was a divergence of opinion in
New York on the issue Ross resolved. Some cases indicated that
the insurer may not implead a third-party before payment of the
67 For cases dismissing complaints where impleader was improper, see
Central Budget Corp. v. Perdigan, 32 Misc. 2d 655, 228 N.Y.S.2d 311 (Sup.
Ct. 1961); Verder v. Schack, 90 N.Y.S.2d 801 (Sup. Ct. 1949).6 8 De Lilli v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 11 App. Div. 2d 839, 202
N.Y.S.2d 857 (3d Dep't 1960) (court must look at third-party pleadings
liberally on a motion to dismiss); Schellhorn v. New York State Elec. &
Gas Corp., 283 App. Div. 678, 127 N.Y.S.2d 182 (3d Dep't 1954) (where
main complaint may be construed as charging third-party plaintiff with
passive negligence even though it also charges him with active negligence,
court will not dismiss third-party complaint).69 See Bernstein v. El-Mar Painting & Decorating Corp., 13 N.Y.2d
1053, 195 N.E.2d 456, 245 N.Y.S.2d 772 (1963) (landlord's tross-complaint
dismissed since he was actively negligent); Note, 28 FoaDHAmI L. Rnv. 782
(1960).
70 13 N.Y.2d 233, 195 N.E.2d 892, 246 N.Y.S.2d 213 (1963).71 1d. at 234, 195 N.E.2d at 893, 246 N.Y.S.2d at 214. But see W. T.
Grant Co. v. Uneeda Doll Co., 19 App. Div. 2d 361, 243 N.Y.S.2d 428 (1st
Dep't 1963).
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